What Kind of Regime Does Philadelphia Have?
Urban Public Policy
Follow the formatting in the writing assignment instructions please.
Private
Into the Public
Changing the Rules of the Game
and New Regime Politics in
Philadelphia Public Education
Katrina E. Bulkley
Montclair State University
Substantial policy and political changes have resulted from a 2001 state
takeover of the Philadelphia School District and the subsequent hiring of Paul
Vallas as the district’s new CEO. Using the lens of urban regime analysis,
which emphasizes the importance of public and private actors in forming a
governing coalition, this article analyzes the Philadelphia education regime
and the policies it has promoted. The author determines that although deci
sion making is highly centralized under this governing coalition, the role of
private actors helps to define the regime as a “contracting regime,” in which
public-private interaction shapes the political and policy context.
Keywords: privatization; urban regimes; Philadelphia reform
During the past several years, Philadelphia’s public education system
has undergone major changes, sparked by a state takeover in 2001 that
created a strong sense of urgency for change in the school system. Changes
have included both centralizing reforms and alterations in school governance.
Some of these reforms were initiated by the state, whereas many were ini
tiated by Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Paul Vallas and the School Reform
Commission (SRC; the CEO and SRC replaced the roles of superintendent
Educational Policy
Volume 21 Number 1
January and March 2007 155-184
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155
Author’s Note: An earlier version of this article, written by Katrina Bulkley and Eva Gold,
was presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association
in San Francisco. The author would like to thank Eva Gold, Suzanne Blanc, Jolley Christman,
Benjamin Herold, Eva Travers, Elizabeth Useem, and two anonymous reviewers for many
helpful ideas and suggestions. Partial funding for the preparation of this study was provided
by the William Penn Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trusts, and the Carnegie Corporation of
New York to Research for Action. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funders.
Section 2: Case Studies of the
Politics of Privatization156 Educational Policy
and school board as part of the takeover). The centralizing reforms include
a districtwide core curriculum and benchmark tests. The significant alter
ations in school configurations and governance include: a shift to K-8
schools, the creation of new small high schools, and the implementation of
a diverse provider model in which 46 schools were put under the manage
ment of for-profit, nonprofit, and university “providers.” Despite early con
troversy over some of the reforms (especially the diverse provider model),
they have generally met with little resistance.
Overall, the years since the takeover have seen a significant increase in
test scores in elementary and middle grades, although the explanation for
these increases is still under study and overall scores are still low relative to
suburban schools (Casserly, 2005; Useem, 2005). Vallas and the SRC have
also improved the sense of legitimacy for the system (Useem, Christman,
& Boyd, 2006).
Clarence Stone (1998b) has argued that to make significant changes in
public education, it is critical that not just policies but also politics change
to support this effort. According to Stone:
Reformers have a strong tendency to focus on what should be, and they often
have great skill in showing why an alternative set of practices would be better
than what is in place. But they frequently fail to pay attention to political
context—to the relationships that are necessary to establish and sustain a
body of practices. (p. 17)
For this article, we use the lens of urban regime theory, which examines the
role of governing coalitions composed of both public and private sector
actors.
In working to build a coalition supporting the schools and at times to
minimize dissent, Vallas and the SRC have brought private actors into the
public fold through formal mechanisms such as contracting and formal
partnerships. This article focuses on the changing nature of such formal
relationships with private actors in Philadelphia and the implications of that
for the nature of the urban regime around school improvement.
This study builds from a much larger study, “Learning from Philadelphia’s
Reform,” that brings together researchers from Research for Action (a
Philadelphia-based research organization) and a number of other universities
and research organizations to study the implementation and impact of changes
under state takeover. In the course of doing research for the larger study, it has
become clear that there are not only changes in the policies for school reform
in Philadelphia but also changes in the “players” and the relationships amongBulkley / Philadelphia Public Education 157
the players governing the reform. Thus, we turned to regime theory to better
understand this new political environment for the city.
Specifically, in this article, we seek to understand what kind of regime
appeared to be emerging in Philadelphia as of the spring of 2006, the role
of private sector actors (both nonprofit and for-profit) in that regime and,
ultimately, the ways in which the overall structure for governing the district
has changed. Understanding the politics linked with reform in the city is
critical to determining the potential for the current reform to be sustained.
In the following sections, we first discuss literature on urban regimes,
including different types of regimes. This is followed by a description of the
governing coalition that has emerged and the policy changes that they have
initiated in Philadelphia. Building on this description, we analyze the
nature of the regime itself, offering a new type of market-based regime—
the “contracting regime”—as a way to understand the politics governing
change in the school district of Philadelphia.
Although this analysis is important to understanding Philadelphia itself,
we believe that there are also implications for changes in cities nationwide,
as many of the same pressures toward bringing in the private sector (includ
ing from No Child Left Behind, NCLB) are being experienced elsewhere
(Burch, 2005).
Regime Theory
Urban regime theory is based on the idea that effective governance in
cities requires stable and durable governing coalitions that include both
public and private actors (Brown, 1999; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001;
Shipps, 2003a; Stone, 1989). As Stone (1998b), one of the original thinkers
in this area, argues, “Urban regime theory posits that policy change comes
about only if reformers establish a new set of political arrangements com
mensurate with the policy being advocated” (p. 9). To do this, reformers
must combine the political and material resources of public actors with
“complementary actions from nongovernmental sources” (Stone, 2005).
Thus, understanding the nature of a governing regime (and whether a
regime is even present in a particular context) is critical for understanding
the path of policy change and its potential for sustainability.
Although many cities have coalitions of public and private actors who
are working on policy issues at any given moment, not all of these coali
tions can be considered regimes. This is because of the focus on stability in
urban regime theory, as Stone (2005) argues:158 Educational Policy
The [urban regime] model focuses on the combination of factors that promise
viable and durable arrangements. The agenda (the problem-solving task),
resource adequacy, and alignment by key actors (the governing coalition) in
that absence of a command system (hence, a need for a scheme of cooperation)—
these are the elements that need to be brought to strength and aligned for gov
erning arrangements to be viable and stable. (p. 331)
However, developing this kind of stability is challenging; noting Stone’s
work, Mossberger and Stoker (2001) argue that regimes are “difficult to
maintain because participants have divergent and overlapping interests”
(p. 815), and the bringing together of the public and private sectors makes
these divergent interests all the more challenging to overcome to sustain a
regime. Regimes can pursue a range of policies, with no particular ideo
logical approach inherent in the concept.
At the center of urban regime theory is a focus on “the partnerships
between public and private institutions through which power in the city is
exercised” (Brown, 1999, p. 73). Originally, the emphasis was on the busi
ness community as the “private” element of this equation, but that concep
tion has been broadened over time to include other nonpublic entities such
as nonprofit organizations and community groups (Brown, 1999). Of par
ticular importance in developing strong civic capacity (necessary, it is
argued, for a strong regime) is engagement by city government and the
business community, Stone (2001) found, with unions, universities, parents,
and community organizations also playing key roles. Urban regime theory
is used to better understand who has power in a particular context and how
and why it is that those with power work together to further policy agendas.
Brown (1999) demonstrates the complexity of the private sector in his
study of the provision of AIDS services in Cristchurch, New Zealand. Like
education regimes, the governing coalition he studied focused on one pol
icy area. He describes how participants in this issue-specific regime are
often connected to multiple organizations—public and private—and that
these intersections and community connections allow for the implementa
tion of policies that involve both public and private sector actors.
Just as the conception of private actors has expanded beyond the for
profit business community, the understanding of what actors constitute the
“public” part of the regime equation has shifted beyond local government.
For example, Burns (2002, 2003) has drawn attention to the important role
that actors at the state level can play in urban regimes. In one study, he exam
ined the urban regime in Hartford, Connecticut, and found that the gover
nor played an important role in education politics in the city because localBulkley / Philadelphia Public Education 159
actors did not have the “capacity to address educational problems,” whereas
the governor “controlled the financial and institutional resources that
Hartford’s educational system needed” (Burns, 2002, p. 66). In another
study, he examined the governing regime in Newark, New Jersey, follow
ing a state takeover (Burns, 2003). He described how the state-appointed
superintendent and the mostly state-appointed district advisory board were
able to alter relationships among key players in the city’s education gov
erning coalition (including the unions and school administrators) and bring
new players (including the business and foundation communities) and new
resources into the district.
Although regime theory highlights both formal and informal relation
ships between the public and private sector, this article focuses on the chang
ing nature of the increasing number of formal intersectoral relationships, as
this is potentially a significant shift in the way that educational services are
provided and thus in the politics that surround the provision of these
services.
An important role for governing coalitions is to bring and make decisions
about using resources. One set of resources available to regimes are “selective
incentives” or “selective benefits” to different actors to engage with and sup
port the regime’s policy agenda. According to Mossberger and Stoker (2001),
“Regimes overcome problems of collective action and secure participation in
the governing coalition through the distribution of selective incentives such as
contracts, jobs, facilities for a particular neighborhood, and so on” (p. 812).
However, selective incentives are not the only reason that actors may partici
pate in regimes; as Stone (2005) discusses, a strong sense of purpose can also
motivate engagement in a governing coalition.
Although regime theory has largely focused on regimes in cities as a
whole, it has also been used as a way to analyze urban educational regimes
(Burns, 2002; Shipps, 2003a, 2003b; Stone, 1996, 1998b) and civic capac
ity around education (Henig, Hula, Orr, & Pedescleaux, 1999; Stone,
1998a). Although education in cities is technically a part of broader urban
governance, education policy and politics are often distinct from city gov
ernment, both formally (in terms of who’s in charge) and informally (e.g.,
in terms of a less central role for business; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001; Wirt
& Kirst, 1997). However, although Mossberger and Stoker (2001) argue
that education coalitions are not necessarily regimes, this article operates
from the stance of Stone (1998b) and others who argue that educational
regimes can and do exist and play an important role in shaping educational
policy. Among other issues, Stone argues that leadership linking noneducators
with professional educators is critical for a strong regime in urban education.160 Educational Policy
Regime Types
Analyses of urban regimes formed around education have identified dif
ferent types of education regimes. Shipps (2003a) argues that it is critical
to understand the link between a particular reform effort and the regime that
is in place to support it, as different kinds of reforms require different coali
tions to be sustained and potentially to become institutionalized. Stone
(1998b) discusses the idea of performance and employment regimes,
whereas Shipps, whose work is based on careful examination of Chicago
education politics, adds to this empowerment and market regimes.
Stone (1998b) argues that although many cities may have education
regimes, few have the kind of regime that leads to sustainable substantial
improvements in education for all children. Such a regime, which he labels
a performance regime, incorporates both public and private (both for-profit
and nonprofit) entities with a shared purpose of school improvement.
Specifically, he argues that changes in leadership in a district are insuffi
cient to build and sustain a performance regime; rather, other kinds of
changes and supports are needed, including resources and popular support.
Shipps (2003a) modifies and narrows Stone’s definition of a performance
regime, describing it as a regime that seeks to change teaching and learning
and has as its core participants teachers, parents, and elected or appointed
officials. Both Shipps and Stone argue that these regimes are difficult to
develop because so many actors need to be engaged, and the regime must
be sustained for a long enough period to lead to deep educational change
(see also Stone, Henig, Jones, & Perannunzi, 2001). For example, based on
his review of case studies in nine cities, Stone argues “that [performance]
regimes now exist only in embryonic form is a sign that politically they are
hard to bring about” (p. 14).
Two other types of regimes are employment and empowerment regimes.
Stone (1998b) discusses employment regimes, in which regime leaders
focus on maintaining the status quo. Core members of an employment
regime are “those groups who materially benefit from the existing gover
nance and teaching arrangements” (Shipps, 2003a, p. 857). In a city such as
Philadelphia, where the school district is a major employer, the pressures
toward employment regimes can be particularly strong (Henig et al., 1999).
Shipps (2003a) also describes empowerment regimes, which aim “to alter
the power relations among adults working in and concerned with schools.
It does so to spur new thinking about, and experimentation with, old prob
lems” (p. 850). The core members of the governing coalition in an empow
erment regime are parents or teachers, politicians, and bureaucrats.Bulkley / Philadelphia Public Education 161
Finally, Shipps (2003a) discusses market regimes. In general, a market
regime “shifts the incentives and rewards for both adults and children from
the professional and bureaucratic expectations that dominate government
run schools to the economic and survival consequences of markets” (p. 850).
Overall, the business sector and its supporters are central to different types
of market regimes. Shipps identifies two types of market regimes: entre
preneurial and corporate. Entrepreneurial market regimes emerge, Shipps
suggests, when school choice becomes central to reform as a strategy to
drive educational change through market forces. In this case, parents are
“core constituents,” as they must be willing to take active roles in the deci
sions about what school their children will attend. In a corporate market
regime, the business community takes an important lead in seeking to redesign
public education in the image of corporate restructuring, including increas
ing bottom-line accountability measures, replacing the superintendent with
a CEO, and downsizing.
Using regime theory as a lens for studying the reform in Philadelphia
can lend important information about the nature of governing coalitions not
only in Philadelphia but also in other cities experiencing growing pressures
to think “outside the box” about educational change, including who is cen
tral to decisions about educational change and the role of nonpublic actors.
Data and Method
This article is a case study of political relationships in Philadelphia (Patton,
1990). The primary data for the study come from a series of papers written for
“Learning from Philadelphia’s School Reform,” a study of Philadelphia’s
reform under state takeover. The broader study brings together researchers
from Research for Action and a number of other universities and research
organizations and includes analyses of issues related to school governance and
civic engagement.
The publications that form the foundation for this secondary analysis are
based on careful analysis of extensive interviews conducted from 2002 to 2006
with approximately 45 district and school administrators, 27 political, civic,
and community leaders, and representatives of groups contracting with the
district. These interviews used semistructured interview protocols and most
were recorded, transcribed, and then coded using Atlas.ti. Interview data were
supplemented with documents including district press releases, SRC resolu
tions and newspaper accounts, and observations of SRC meetings, district con
ferences, meetings, and professional development given by both districts and162 Educational Policy
providers. Among the key papers that were analyzed for this study are
Bulkley, Mundell, and Riffer (2004), Christman, Gold, and Herold (2005),
Gold, Christman, and Herold (in press), Gold, Cucchiara, Simon, and Riffer
(2005), Simon, Gold, Mundell, Riffer, and Cucchiara (2004), Travers (2003),
Useem (2005), and Useem et al. (2006).
Two research questions drove the analysis of these studies and research
summaries: (a) What is the nature of the regime that has developed in
Philadelphia following state takeover? (b) In what way are private entities
engaged in the governing regime? The papers used as data were read care
fully for any discussion of power within the current governing coalition,
including the roles of different actors and “missing voices” (those actors
who were not discussed in the papers). Careful attention was paid to any
inconsistencies across documents.
The Seeds of Reform
To examine the nature of Philadelphia’s governing regime, it is impor
tant to have a basic understanding of the political and policy contexts for
reform.
11
Prior to the state takeover, the Philadelphia School District had a
long history of significant fiscal and academic problems and continually
struggled with the state over finance issues. Longstanding fiscal problems
for the districts were exacerbated by the state’s decision to freeze state
funding for public schools at 1993 levels, with annual adjustments that did
not allow for enrollment changes or specific needs of students (Boyd &
Christman, 2003; Christman & Rhodes, 2002).
Philadelphia had several significant efforts at reform prior to the
takeover, most recently through the Children Achieving program, created
and led by Superintendent David Hornbeck in the 1990s (Corcoran &
Christman, 2002). Children Achieving, supported by an Annenberg
Challenge Grant and funding from local foundations, focused on bringing
ideas of systemic reform to Philadelphia (Corcoran & Christman, 2002;
Smith & O’Day, 1991). It was “based on the assumption that previous
attempts at reform have largely failed because they were too incremental,
too piecemeal, and too narrowly framed, and because they did not attempt
to alter the ‘system’ itself” (Boyd & Christman, 2003, p. 103).
On the one hand, Hornbeck and Children Achieving brought substantial
private resources to the district ($150 million through the Annenberg
Challenge Grant and the money raised to meet the challenge). Indeed, the
reform did lead to some test score gains (Christman, 2001). However,Bulkley / Philadelphia Public Education 163
Hornbeck encountered significant problems both within and outside the dis
trict and was unable to build the kind of governing coalition needed to sus
tain his reform. Overall, there was a “lack of consensus around the important
values underlying Children Achieving” (Boyd & Christman, 2003, p. 104)
within the district. In addition, according to Boyd and Christman (2003), sup
port for the reform from teachers, who did not feel respected by Hornbeck,
and principals was limited. Hornbeck’s relationship with the Philadelphia
Federation of Teachers (PFT) was particularly strained. City corporate and
civic leaders who had been instrumental in bringing Hornbeck to the district
supported him in the early years of the reform (Boyd & Christman, 2003).
However, their support waned when Hornbeck was unable to win conces
sions from the teachers union and when struggles with the state over fiscal
issues caused state-district relations to become increasingly confrontational.
Relations between Hornbeck and local community groups were mixed, with
some feeling like they had a place in the reform, whereas others became dis
illusioned over time (Christman & Rhodes, 2002).
Outside the district, Hornbeck’s efforts at reform also faced difficult cir
cumstances, especially with state actors. Although some of these challenges
predated Hornbeck, many of them were exacerbated by his confrontational
approach to working with state policy makers (Boyd & Christman, 2003).
When Hornbeck took the position in Philadelphia, the governor’s office and
legislature were held by Democrats, who are far more inclined than are state
Republicans to lend a sympathetic ear to the plight (especially the fiscal plight)
of the city’s schools. This changed in 1994, when voters elected a Republican
governor and gave the Republicans majority control in both of the state leg
islative houses, and tensions with Hornbeck quickly escalated.
Tensions between the state and Hornbeck were exacerbated when, in
1998, Hornbeck threatened to approve an unbalanced budget. In response,
the governor and legislature passed the first of two bills (Act 46, which
focused on fiscal issues in districts as the basis for takeover) that enabled a
state takeover of the district (Boyd & Christman, 2003; Maranto, 2005).
Two years later, the state adopted a second bill enabling state takeover (Act
16, which targeted districts with high levels of low student achievement).
Hornbeck’s time in Philadelphia came to an end in 2000, soon after the sec
ond bill was adopted, when he resigned in protest of the city’s and state’s
unwillingness to provide additional funds to the city’s schools.
Following Hornbeck’s departure was a time of uncertainty in Philadelphia,
which included the appointment of an interim CEO for the city’s schools
(Philip Goldsmith) and the election of Mayor John Street. Then, in 2001,
Governor Tom Ridge, who had previously demonstrated a commitment to164 Educational Policy
market-based reforms in education (including vouchers and charters), gave a
$2.7 million contract to Edison Schools to conduct a study of the Philadelphia
School District and propose changes to improve the city’s schools. The Edison
report, released in October 2001, recommended that a SRC, with four
members appointed by the governor and one by the mayor, replace the dis
trict’s school board (and have much broader powers than the board) and that
management of many of the city’s struggling schools, and the school district
central office, be placed in the hands of a private company (e.g., Edison itself).
Protests ensued in response to Edison’s recommendations, especially
those involving the role of private companies (Travers, 2003). However, not
all in the city were opposed to either the takeover or the involvement of pri
vate companies; according to Useem and her colleagues (2006),
Even some of Philadelphia’s most prominent African American legislators,
fed up with [the] district’s lack of progress, supported the idea that the com
bination of a radical change in governance along with involvement of exter
nal groups in school management might jumpstart change. (p. 7)
Then, in December 2001, the governor and Mayor Street compromised on
a “friendly” takeover of the district, in part because of the mayor’s concerns
about the increasingly dire fiscal condition of the district. As a part of that
compromise, an SRC was created (as recommended in the Edison report),
but with three gubernatorial and two mayoral appointees, and the proposal
to have a private company manage the district was dropped. In addition,
both the city and state agreed to provide considerable additional funding for
the new reform ($45 million from the city, $75 million from the state).
Local businessman James Nevels became the first member of the SRC,
and its chair, and the SRC was fully operational by spring 2002. Moving
forward without a new CEO yet in place, the SRC quickly decided to shift
away from a single private manager for the district’s lowest-performing
schools, opting instead for a diverse provider model (described below).
Several months later, in July 2002, the SRC hired former Chicago Public
Schools CEO Vallas to head the Philadelphia district. Vallas quickly estab
lished himself as a “man of action” and initiated a flurry of new reforms
(described more below). One of his first decisions was to move even further
away from the original Edison report recommendations than had the SRC
by eliminating the idea of contracting out major district functions; he was
quoted as saying, “There’s no need for that. That’s what I’m here for”
(Brennan, 2002, p. 3). While eschewing the idea of private management ofBulkley / Philadelphia Public Education 165
the district as a whole, Vallas (who has been called the “ultimate pragma
tist”; Useem, 2005, p. 8) was clear about his openness to involvement of
outside organizations (for-profit and nonprofit) in district reform efforts.
Alongside the many changes happening in Philadelphia itself, the broader
context of school reform nationally has also played an important role in the
city’s reform efforts. Specifically, just a month after the official state takeover,
the federal NCLB legislation was adopted. NCLB, with its strong focus on
outcomes and encouragement of solutions outside the public sector, hap
pened amid a general trend toward privatization (Burch, 2005; Gold et al.,
2005; Useem, 2005); these pressures had a significant impact on the
Philadelphia reform. Other ideas in the national water, such as focusing on
teacher quality (linked with NCLB) and the creation of small high schools,
also showed up in the Philadelphia reform.
Philadelphia’s Governing Regime
Under State Takeover
This section describes the decision-making regime that has developed
around education in Philadelphia under state takeover. The following section
discusses the substance of the reform that has resulted from the work of this
governing coalition, for it is the interaction of the nature of the reforms them
selves and the governing coalition that has critical implications for the poten
tial for sustained and institutionalized change. First, however, it is important
to describe what makes the Philadelphia governing coalition a regime, as
defined by Stone (2005) and others. Stone argues that, at its core, a regime
needs to have stability. Although the long-term prospects for the Philadelphia
regime are unclear, the current governing coalition is going into its 5th year,
by urban reform standards a relatively long period. As well, the core members
of the reform (described below) have remained relatively constant during this
period. With additional resources coming to the district from the state, city,
and private actors, the current governing coalition has also had more adequate
resources than available in the past (although the continued availability of
these resources is in question). Combined with a clear agenda that is shared
by most of the central players, the Philadelphia governing coalition appears
to meet Stone’s definition of a regime.
Although there were protests, particularly around the role of Edison, at
the time of the takeover, the political scene around the takeover has been
relatively calm. As Simon and her colleagues (2004) note, Philadelphia’s
regime under Vallas166 Educational Policy
has encountered minimal opposition to its agenda. This lack of protest is par
ticularly striking in light of the activism that occurred earlier against privati
zation and the extent to which the grassroots community had been mobilized
around education issues at the time of the state takeover. (p. 17)
Central Players
There seems to be little question about who constitute the core members
of Philadelphia’s governing regime—at the center are CEO Vallas and the SRC.
Although Vallas and Jim Nevels (the chair of the SRC) are clearly the public
faces of reform, Vallas and the SRC work closely together on the direction
for change and appear to generally have a “we’re in it together” attitude that
is combined with a shared sense of purpose. District central office staff also
play important roles, but there is less “give and take” than in the Hornbeck
administration. For example, one participant in meetings of top administra
tors said,
Paul comes in, sits at the head of the table, and all these people sit around,
they don’t really say anything, there’s not any exchange….Paul talks and
people say, “Yes, Paul.” (quoted in Useem et al., 2006, p. 43)
The SRC has been an active and engaged partner with Vallas and has sig
nificantly more power under the takeover legislation than a regular school
board; in part, this is because of the changes in state law that opened the
door for the takeover and gave the SRC much broader powers than a regu
lar school board, including taking away teachers’ right to strike (Useem
et al., 2006). As well, the SRC has presented a more unified front than is
often the case with school boards. As Useem (2005) describes,
The absence of a contentious and narrowly focused school board means that
CEO Vallas has had the freedom to direct his attention to solving district
problems without the distractions of board divisions and interventions that so
often bedevil urban superintendents. . . . Disagreements [among SRC
members] have, for the most part, been kept behind closed doors. (p. 6)
Two other groups also play important roles in overall decision making—
state-level actors and the PFT. As Burns (2002, 2003) shows, governors and
other state officials can play an important part of local urban education
regimes, especially when the state takes a more active role in educational
governance. In Philadelphia, state actors (especially the governor’s office
and key local state legislators) have continued to participate in discussionsBulkley / Philadelphia Public Education 167
about the future of the district, and Vallas has made a point of building good
relationships with them. The facts that more than half of the district’s fiscal
support comes from the state and that additional state allocations fund some
of the reforms have made close contact with state leaders a necessity. The
governor’s power to appoint the majority of the SRC members ensures a
continued strong role for the state.
Although the majority of the SRC members are appointed by the gover
nor, the SRC quickly established some independence from the state by
moving toward a diverse provider model and away from using Edison as the
primary provider of school management services (Useem et al., 2006). In
addition, the SRC challenged the state over the flexibility of state money
coming to the district; Useem and her colleagues (2006) argue that this
linked the SRC with the city against the state, helping to build trust both
among SRC members and between the SRC and the Philadelphia commu
nity. Although the state is not controlling the SRC, it is more closely
engaged with the Vallas regime than it was with Hornbeck, and in a gener
ally more positive way.
During the Hornbeck era, relationships with the two main education
unions—the PFT and the Commonwealth Association of School Adminis
trators (CASA)—were strained (Boyd & Christman, 2003; Maranto, 2005).
Prior to Vallas, the PFT was “long a thorn in the side of reform-minded dis
trict administrators” (Useem et al., 2006, p. 16). From the beginning, Vallas
has worked to develop a more positive relationship with the unions, espe
cially the PFT, which has been aided by a considerable amount of general
agreement about the direction of reform (e.g., during the Hornbeck admin
istration, the union was interested in a core curriculum, something provided
by Vallas). According to Useem et al. (2006),
Vallas makes a point of talking with PFT leaders on a regular basis, seeking
out their counsel, informing them in advance of changes in policies or prac
tices and involving them in the rollout of various pieces of the reform. He
goes out of his way to regularly praise the PFT as indispensable partners in
the reform effort. (p. 39)
The fact that Vallas has had a better relationship with the PFT than
Hornbeck did was also influenced by the union itself being weakened under
state takeover and Vallas’s need to have the labor force cooperate for his
reforms to be effective (Useem, 2005). The increasing prominence of char
ter schools, a relatively small issue under Hornbeck, has also diminished
the power of the PFT as an increasing number of public school teachers are168 Educational Policy
not working in unionized environments. Vallas’s efforts to work with the
PFT, as least in the early days of the reform, were aided by the “thin man
agement” aspect of the diverse provider model. Under thin management,
providers were granted control over some aspects of schooling, including
curriculum and professional development, but were not provided with con
trol over critical issues including the hiring and firing of teachers (Bulkley
et al., 2004). Thin management meant the union was asked to give up very
little in the way of “bread-and-butter” issues such as salary and job secu
rity. Other than through their unions, principals and teachers have not
played significant roles in guiding this reform.
Particularized Influence: For-Profit and
Nonprofit Groups or Companies
The tight core of the current regime involves a relatively small number of
players. However, with the active engagement of many outside actors in the
reform, it is inevitable that these organizations will have some influence on—
and stake in—the regime itself. The period since Vallas and the SRC began
their work has been marked by a substantial increase in the formal engage
ment of private organizations (both for-profit and nonprofit) with the district.
In some cases, these groups had little engagement with the district prior to
receiving contracts (including some of the providers in the diverse provider
model), whereas other organizations have worked in the Philadelphia public
schools for years.
Prior to the takeover, many of these groups had, as the core of their
mission, providing services to and a voice for some of the city’s most dis
advantaged communities. Now, many of these groups are directly involved
in the district’s reform efforts. However, the heavy use of selective incentives
(especially contracts) may be shifting the focus of these groups from dis
trictwide challenges to the specific purpose of fulfilling the expectations of
their contracts. Such a shift has the potential to inhibit these groups from tak
ing an active role in broader discussions about the direction of the reform
effort and its effects on the populations that they have traditionally sought to
serve (Gold et al., 2005).
In their study of the role of several civic organizations in Philadelphia’s
reform, Gold and her colleagues (2005) found that
once groups (or individuals) have accepted a contract with the district to pro
vide a service, they are, to an extent that varies from case to case, tied finan
cially to the school district. As a result, their ability to set their own agendaBulkley / Philadelphia Public Education 169
around education—and to influence the district’s—is constrained, account
ability can be limited to contractual terms, and “partners” can have a more
difficult time expressing criticism of district initiatives. (p. 10)
This concern was particularly pertinent for grassroots nonprofits and
community-based organizations that have “little in terms of material resources
to offer the district (and, hence, fewer forms of leverage)” as opposed to
institutional nonprofit organizations (universities, hospitals, museums, and
cultural institutions) that “may be able to accept contracts from the district
without sacrificing their ability to exert pressure when and where they see
fit” (Gold et al., 2005, p. 10). In addition to contracting with outside groups,
the district has hired a number of key individuals who have worked for
these groups, bringing the groups links with the formal power structure.
The combination of the use of selective incentives to tie groups to the
regime and the hiring of key individuals from the community may help to
explain why “while grassroots and community organizations are clearly not
among the key power brokers in the current administration, they have largely
refrained from openly challenging Vallas or the reforms that have been imple
mented since he took office” (Simon et al., 2004, p. 20). Although there have
been “vigorous efforts by Vallas and other district leaders to build ties to
public stakeholders, parents, and community groups” (Useem et al., 2006,
- 13), these efforts have been more about building support for the reform
than engaging these groups in decision making about the reform.
Less Influential…
Although Vallas and the SRC clearly operate in the center of the regime,
some of the other actors who the literature suggests are critical for a strong
governing regime are relatively peripheral, including the mayor, the business
community, parents, and the general public. Burns (2002) notes, “Local gov
ernment officials and business leaders are central to many regimes because
they allocate resources, such as authority, productive assets, finance, and
information that make urban governance possible” (p. 56). In the original
debates about the state takeover, Mayor Street played a critical role in fight
ing the state’s efforts to assert control, despite his statements while a candi
date for mayor that suggested he was uninterested in gaining a greater role
in the schools if elected (Boyd & Christman, 2003). However, following the
compromise with the state that led to a “friendly” takeover, Mayor Street and
the city government have taken an overall backseat role in the reform,
although they have been engaged in particular areas (i.e., coordinated170 Educational Policy
services). The relationship between Vallas and Street has been described as
“cordial but not particularly close” (Useem et al., 2006, p. 34).
The Philadelphia business community, with the exception of involvement
in specific projects, has been supportive of, but relatively unengaged in,
broad decisions about district policy under Vallas and the SRC. District
leaders have sought to keep the business community informed of district
efforts, and business leaders helped with the “Campaign for Human Capital”
initiative (an effort to improve teacher retention and recruitment), but the
business community does not appear to be influencing the overall direction
of the reform (Useem et al., 2006). This is a result not only of the engage
ment of the existing business community but also of the shrinking of the
local business community as a whole because of broader economic changes.
As one funder of Children Achieving described, “What happened was a
rapid transformation from businesses led by Philly people to businesses
without a vested interest in Philadelphia, or an understanding of the city”
(quoted in Boyd & Christman, 2003, p. 110).
22
Parents, parent organizations, and the public more broadly have not
played strong roles in the Vallas regime. The public has been limited in its
ability to provide input on decisions about reform, such as the selection of
providers for the diverse provider model and the design of new discipline
policies (Useem et al., 2006). For example, one of the ways that dissent was
minimized in the early days of the SRC was through the rules for speaking
at SRC meetings; as Useem and her colleagues (2006) describe, “Speakers
had to give district staff prior notification that they would speak, had to pro
vide 10 copies of their comments, and were limited to three minutes of
speaking time” (p. 24).
Vallas has made an effort to reach out to individual parents; however, as
Useem and her colleagues (2006) point out, “When it came to decisions
about the reform plan itself,… the SRC and CEO Vallas made little effort
to seek parent and community involvement in deliberations” (p. 27).
Specifically, in the area of contracting, “the process of developing and
approving contracts has been largely hidden from public view” (Gold et al.,
2005, p. 9) or input.
Overview of the Philadelphia Regime
Although the Philadelphia governing coalition under state takeover is
fairly narrow, with limited involvement with decision making by actors
including the mayor, the business community, and civic organizations, there
are a number of reasons why the reforms have generally (so far) been metBulkley / Philadelphia Public Education 171
with support rather than significant political tensions or power struggles.
Useem and her colleagues (2006) argue that the SRC and Vallas have suc
ceeded in building public confidence in the Philadelphia schools and sup
port for the current reform, aided by positive press and rising test scores.
This has enabled the reform’s leaders to experiment in ways, such as
engagement with private actors, that would be politically very challenging
in a less positive environment. In addition, as discussed earlier, the use of
selective incentives (especially contracting) has created a situation in which
many of those who might challenge the Vallas regime are in fact a part of it
and thus no longer critical outsiders. Finally, the broader context of NCLB,
with its focus on many of the same types of reforms as those initiated by
Vallas and the SRC (increased use of testing, engagement with private
actors, etc.), has provided the regime with a strong external justification for
its decisions (Useem, 2005).
Policy Changes Since the Takeover
Shipps (2003b) argues that understanding the substance of reform is crit
ical to understanding the regime itself. Thus, this section describes the major
reforms currently underway in Philadelphia. Beginning with the appointment
of the SRC and dramatically accelerated by the arrival of Vallas, the govern
ing coalition described above has promulgated a flurry of broad changes in
Philadelphia public education. Overall, since Vallas’s arrival, there has been
a general trend toward centralizing district operations but doing so through
reforms initiated by the central office and often supported by contractors.
Throughout this section, we include descriptions of the roles of these private
contractors, as their engagement sets the stage for understanding the regime
operating in Philadelphia. The reforms adopted have, overall, been consistent
with the policies and goals of NCLB; as Useem (2005) argues, “Both SRC
members and the Vallas administration have embraced the spirit of NCLB
and have taken very seriously the enforcement of its regulations” (p. 4).
Vallas-Initiated Reforms
One of Vallas’s first initiatives was to institute a districtwide core cur
riculum in four academic subjects for grades K-8. The district worked in
partnership on the writing of the K-8 core curriculum with the Philadelphia
Education Fund (PEF), a well-known and respected organization in the city
that had worked closely with the Hornbeck administration. Simon and her172 Educational Policy
colleagues (2004) argue that hiring PEF put a “stamp of legitimacy on the
curriculum for Philadelphia teachers” (p. 19) and brought an important
organization into “the fold” of the Vallas regime. In 2003-2004, the district
added a requirement that all elementary students have 120 minutes of liter
acy and 90 minutes of math per day, based on the core curriculum (Travers,
2003). Increased testing, including 6-week formative benchmark tests
(written by a contractor and inspired in part by Edison’s use of benchmark
tests) also accompanied the new core curriculum (Useem, 2005). Alongside
the creation of the K-8 core curriculum (which was mandatory for regular
district schools but voluntary for those managed by providers) was a move
to eliminate middle schools in favor of K-8 schools.
Although the initial focus for curricular and structural changes was
schools serving K-8 students, there has been increasing attention to the
challenges of high school reform. This has included the adoption of a new
high school curriculum designed by Kaplan K12 Learning Services and a
push to create more smaller high schools throughout the city. Originally,
some of these new high schools were supposed to be working with private
“transition managers” (Kaplan K12 Learning Services, Princeton Review,
SchoolWorks LLC, and ResulTech), but these contracts were abruptly ter
minated in spring 2006 because of financial constraints. Other high schools
have private organizations, including Microsoft and Philadelphia Citizens
for Children and Youth, participating in their development. Vallas’s goal is
to have 66 high schools operating by 2006 (as compared to 38 in 2002),
with all but 4 of them serving fewer than 500 students (Useem et al., 2006).
Vallas and the SRC also initiated a school quality review process, begin
ning in 2002-2003; this process included regular district schools, those in
the diverse provider model, and the city’s many charter schools. Christman
and her colleagues (2005) argue, “Like the core curriculum, the school
review process was a way for the district to exert its influence on providers
and their schools” (p. 12).
Another of Vallas’s new initiatives was the expansion of extended-day and
summer-school programs for poor-performing students. The district con
tracted with Princeton Review and Voyager Expanded Learning to provide
the curriculum for the extended-day program. This curriculum is used both
by the district directly and by local organizations (some of which had previ
ously been operating their own after-school programs) that have received
contracts to serve 4,300 students (Simon et al., 2004; Useem, 2005). In out
sourcing to community organizations, some groups had to shift their existing
programs to meet the district’s standards, including placing a greater empha
sis on test scores. Thus, it was “clear that the organizations involved haveBulkley / Philadelphia Public Education 173
become incorporated into the district’s structure and agenda . . . in a way that
they were not in the past” (Gold et al., 2005, p. 11).
From the beginning, bringing new strategies to discipline problems has
also been a focus for Vallas and the SRC, and they have adopted a zero
tolerance policy for certain behaviors. The district outsourced management
of disciplinary schools to four national for-profit companies and one non
profit organization, serving nearly 3,000 students in spring 2005 (up from
1,000 students in 2000) (Christman et al., 2005). Finally, the district began
the implementation of new information/data management systems (SchoolNet
and SchoolStat) designed to provide those at the district and school levels
with up-to-date data about students and schools.
The Diverse Provider Model
Although not initiated by Vallas, the creation of a diverse provider model
was probably the most visible change to result from the takeover in the
landscape of Philadelphia public education (Bulkley et al., 2004). Building
on work by Paul Hill and his colleagues (Hill, Campbell, & Harvey, 2000;
Hill, Pierce, & Guthrie, 1997) and the Edison report recommendations, the
diverse provider model was a response to a push from the state to create a
more “market-based approach to the challenges facing Philadelphia public
schools” (Bulkley et al., 2004, p. 1). The diverse provider model “dramati
cally extends the practice of outsourcing educational services into the core
functions of public schools—the design and delivery of educational
programs” (Christman et al., 2005, p. 4).
In total, seven different organizations (three for-profit educational man
agement organizations [EMOs], two locally based nonprofits, and two uni
versities) were hired to provide some level of management services in 46 of
the district’s 264 schools (Bulkley et al., 2004). To support these and other
changes in Philadelphia, in July 2002, the state provided $55 million in
additional funding to the district, $37.5 million of which was devoted to the
adoption of the diverse provider model. The SRC also created a separate
Office of Restructured Schools (ORS) as its own internal provider to over
see 21 additional low-performing schools, granted additional funding to 16
low-performing schools that were making progress, and converted three
additional schools to charter schools (Useem, 2005). Thus, the creation of
the diverse provider model initially affected 86 schools (Research for
Action, 2005).
One important aspect of the diverse provider model as implemented in
Philadelphia was that it relied on thin management. The Philadelphia174 Educational Policy
School District has retained control of facilities management, school safety,
and the school calendar, and, most importantly, school employees (includ
ing teachers and principals) remain district employees under their respec
tive union contracts (Bulkley et al., 2004; Gold, Christman, & Herold, in
press). Although the original discussions of involving private school man
agers included partnering those managers with community-linked organi
zations, the diverse provider model in practice does not include a formal
component that connects providers with communities.
In theory, a diverse provider model involves shifting decision making
away from districts and toward outsider managers. However, the schools
and providers involved in the diverse provider model have felt the pull of
the Vallas-initiated centralizing district reforms. As one provider’s repre
sentative commented, “Vallas is changing all the rules. We feel like we are
being sucked into the tidal wave of centralized control” (quoted in Bulkley
et al., 2004, p. 6). For example, many of the providers (with the exception
of Edison) are using parts or all of the district’s core curriculum and the
benchmark tests aligned with it. The provider schools have also seen
changes in their grade configurations to align with the district’s push to K-8
schools and have been required to provide extended day programs. According
to Useem et al. (2006), “What looked initially like a quasi-decentralized
system of externally-managed schools actually became part of the more
centralized system in practice” (p. 35).
The broader message of these district expectations on provider schools
was that the diverse provider model is a part of the district, not separate
from it. As one district administrator noted, “The EMOs [here referring to
the full range of providers] learned that they had to do it within the frame
work of what was already here. They had to become part of us, not [expect]
us [to] become part of them” (quoted in Gold et al., in press). This is con
sistent with the idea that, to the extent that there is a market for educational
services in Philadelphia, the district is the consumer whose needs must be
met (Gold et al., in press).
33
Changes in District Management and
Public-Private Engagement
These substantive changes have been accompanied by an important set of
shifts in the operations of the district central office and reflect changes in the
relationships between the district and private organizations that include, but
extend beyond, the diverse provider model. The involvement of private and
nonprofit organizations with the Philadelphia public schools did not beginBulkley / Philadelphia Public Education 175
with the state takeover; indeed, Superintendent Constance Clayton pro
moted increased engagement of the nonprofit sector in the 1980s (Boyd &
Christman, 2003).
However, since 2001, a broader cross-section of the private section then
had previously been engaged with the district has been brought more and
more formally into the public education system, with a particularly signif
icant use of contracting. For example, from 2002 to 2003, the number of
contracts from the district for more than $25,000 doubled (Useem & Rinko,
2006). In making this shift, Vallas, the SRC, and central office personnel
have gone beyond simply writing contracts with school providers and the
many private organizations that are playing a role in Philadelphia’s reform
to actually reshaping the district to better pursue this task. Thus, the central
office has made adjustments to try to be a better manager of the many dif
ferent contracts that play a role in the broader district effort, developing
what Gold and her colleagues (2005) describe as a “contracting environ
ment.” According to them, “Vallas carried out the SRC’s commitment to
involve the private sector in school management and led the development
of a new institutional infrastructure for engaging with public and private
organizations” (p. 8).
In looking at Philadelphia’s diverse provider model, Gold et al. (in press)
argue that a “hybrid” model of public-private engagement “characterized
by cross-sectoral collaboration between public and private sectors” is
emerging. Building on literature in both economics and education, they
describe a hybrid system as “A ‘stable network model’ . . . characterized by
a core public organization that develops long-term relationships with a
fixed and trusted set of private providers” (p. 22). In the Philadelphia case,
the core public organization is the district, and the challenge in developing
this stable network, has been altering the district central office to support
these public-private relationships.
Specifically, Vallas created the Office of Development, which was given
the tasks of “handling contracts with outside organizations, fostering an
‘entrepreneurial spirit’ in the district and creating an environment con
ducive to the development of productive relationships with for- and non
profit groups” (Gold et al., 2005, p. 8). In fall of 2005, the EMOs were
removed from the Office of Development and placed in their own special
subdistrict based on the justification that these schools have different needs
because they are no longer under development (some of these schools also
became part of the new Center City district as well). Gold and her col
leagues (in press) argue that this reflects the institutionalization of the
diverse provider model.176 Educational Policy
Although there has been an increasing attempt to engage outside organiza
tions, this pursuit has been focused on bringing for-profit and nonprofit enti
ties into collaboration with the district in support of the district’s own goals.
Indeed, “district officials note that the current partnership process represents a
major shift from the previous approach to external relationships” (Gold et al.,
in press), where relationships were often directly between outside organiza
tions and individual schools. Rather, the focus now is on formal relationships
between the district and outside organizations, usually either in the form of a
contract for services to be provided by the outside organization or as a “mem
orandum of understanding” that specifies what the outside organization will
do and how this ties to broader district goals.
Included in these formal relationships are often means for evaluating if the
partnership is successful in addressing district goals. Thus, the nature of con
tracting in Philadelphia is not about turning over control to private entities but
about cross-sectoral collaboration and joint ventures with blurred boundaries
between public and private (Gold et al., in press; Henig, Holyoke, Lacireno
Paquet, & Moser, 2003; Rufos-Lignos & Richards, 2003; Wohlstetter, Malloy,
Smith, & Hentschke, 2004). Overall, the rhetoric of the reform has been about
bringing in the private sector to support and enhance reform efforts through
“much-needed managerial and technological expertise, new ideas, an entre
preneurial spirit, and material resources” (Useem, 2005, p. 8).
Analysis
What Kind of Regime Does Philadelphia Have?
Shipps (2003a) and Stone (1998b) identify a number of different kinds
of educational regimes, including performance, empowerment, market, and
employment regimes. As described above, the regime in Philadelphia is rel
atively limited in terms of who is regularly involved in decisions about the
overall direction of reform, and the reform itself is an interesting amalgam
of centralizing reforms that rely heavily on outside actors for both design
and implementation of specific components of reform. Returning to the
types of regimes discussed earlier, we ask, what kind of regime is this?
First, there are a number of types of regimes that clearly do not fit the
Philadelphia political context and the substance of the reform effort.
Performance regimes, as described by both Shipps (2003a) and Stone (1998b),
include a broad coalition in support of sustained efforts to improve teaching
and learning. Although a number of the Philadelphia reforms are focused on
changing teaching and learning, there is little of the broad engagement ofBulkley / Philadelphia Public Education 177
teachers and parents that is the hallmark of a true (and sustainable) perfor
mance regime.
Philadelphia also looks little like an empowerment regime. Although some
civic groups and leaders have been “empowered” by being brought into the
formal structure of the district through contracts or hiring practices, their
overall influence is largely “particularized,” with a subsequent focus on spe
cific tasks or issues. There is little in either the substance of the reforms or the
nature of the governing coalition that suggests a focus on shifting power.
Finally, there is no evidence of an employment regime, whose primary goal
is maintenance of the status quo. Although not everything has changed in
Philadelphia, the status quo has definitely not been the focus.
Although the Philadelphia regime does not resemble any of the types
above, it does have similarities to Shipps’s market regimes. In entrepre
neurial regimes, the focus is on change through reforms that create a market
for schools among parents. However, although students do have more
choices in Philadelphia then they did 10 years ago (thanks in large part to a
growing charter school sector), choice as a driver for school improvement
has not been a central part of the district’s agenda.
In many ways, Philadelphia looks like a corporate market regime, with
many of the reforms consistent with business ideals (including the heavy
use of outsourcing). However, the governing coalition itself is substantively
distinct, with little direct involvement from the business community at
either the city or state levels—in other words, it is not a particularly corpo
rate regime, despite the corporate nature of many of its reforms. Although
some of the private organizations that have contracts with the state are
involved in discussions about specific aspects of the reform, they do not
participate in the broader discussions of the governing coalition. Shipps
(2003b) places corporate involvement in the governing coalition as central
to a corporate regime; based on her description, the Philadelphia regime
does not fit this category.
Philadelphia as a Contracting Regime
An important distinction between the regime in Philadelphia and corpo
rate or entrepreneurial market regimes is that actors tied to the district
itself—particularly the SRC and CEO Vallas—are the central and driving
decision makers. Neither the business community nor parents play an espe
cially important role in Philadelphia. Following Shipps’s argument that one
needs to look at the substance of reform to help understand the nature of the
regime, we considered the role of Philadelphia’s shift toward the increased178 Educational Policy
engagement of outside actors in the district’s reform efforts and the effects
of that shift on the regime itself.
Henig (personal communication, March 12, 2006) has suggested that dis
tricts such as Philadelphia may be moving in the direction of contracting
regimes, in which district central offices contract with a variety of private orga
nizations to provide services. He argues that this may become an increasingly
common form of a market regime in education, in which the private sector is
engaged with the district as a consumer rather than with individual students or
parents; this benefits both the district (which maintains control) and vendors
(which do not have to contend with “selling” to individual schools, parents,
and students). Even in Chicago, where Shipps (2003b) identifies other forms
of market regimes, contracting has been prevalent: “Big contracts to corporate
businesses, institutions of higher education, and favored community groups
encouraged in the 1995 law have also solidified financial ties between the dis
trict and other sectors of the city’s economy” (p. 122). In Chicago, Vallas
argued that such contracting increases efficiency and improves support for the
school system (Shipps, 2003b).
Although contracting has long existed in other sectors, it has usually not
played as central a role in education (see Henig, 1989). Privatization,
broadly speaking, involves “a ‘tool-box’ of techniques from which officials
may draw down those most appropriate to meet the tasks at hand”; such
techniques might include “contracting out, user fees, vouchers, asset sales,
and deregulation” (Feigenbaum & Henig, 1994, p. 186). In Philadelphia
and many other cities, contracting out has been the primary tool used in
shifts toward privatization (Burch, 2005). Contracting can occur in many
aspects of school district life. However, Burch (2005) has highlighted four
areas—test development and preparation, data management and reporting,
content area–specific programming, and remedial services—as “dominant
domains of contracting out in the K-12 education sector.”
In a contracting regime, the use of private sector organizations to address
district problems is central to the district strategy for improvement, and
adjustments in district structures are made to support and accommodate
cross-sectoral collaboration. On the basis of their research, Christman and
her colleagues (2005) argue,
Districts must pay close attention to developing a system-wide environment
that truly supports school partnerships with external organizations. They
must remove bureaucratic obstacles, monitor performance, ensure the part
nerships are sustainable through turnover of school and district administra
tors, and create a productive tension between centralization and autonomy.Bulkley / Philadelphia Public Education 179
Districts must also get to know each external partner well so that they can
capitalize on the strengths of each organization and minimize the weaknesses.
(p. 10)
What, then, are the implications of a contracting regime for the governing
coalition itself? First, at the center are those actors who have the ability to
grant contracts—in the case of Philadelphia, this is CEO Vallas and the
SRC. Also important are those who have direct influence on the resources
necessary for reform and contracting. In the Philadelphia case, this includes
state actors (legislators and the governor) who have a strong influence on
the funding the district receives. It also includes the PFT, which has sway
with a critical resource for implementing reform—the teachers themselves—
and has helped advise the district on teacher responses to reform (Useem
et al., 2006). (However, one could imagine a contracting regime in which a
teachers union did not play a central role.)
In addition, some of those receiving contracts can play an important role
in contracting regimes, although this is not a given. As Gold and her col
leagues (in press) describe, there are incentives for public organizations to
develop a stable environment for a limited number of contractors; in such a
scenario, it seems likely that those contractors would gain greater influence
on decision making. Contractors can also gain influence, as some have in
Philadelphia, through strong political ties to the district (i.e., through staff
members who have moved from district to contractor; Henig et al., 2003;
Henig, Holyoke, Brown, & Lacireno-Paquet, 2005). Finally, contractors,
who serve a function that is difficult for the district to either fulfill or hire
someone else to fulfill, may gain influence in their particular domain.
44
Although the focus of contracting is on the role of outside organizations
in furthering a district’s reform agenda, contracting also has other political
implications. For example, contracting may be used to develop or reinforce
political ties between a regime and important state and local actors, thus
creating and enhancing its long-term stability and viability, even if at the
cost of the “official” justifications of efficiency and effectiveness.
Contracting Regimes and Educational Reform
What are the implications of a contracting regime for the substance and
process of reform? First of all, in a contracting regime, private sector organi
zations are central to the district strategy for improvement, and contracts are
used to address core functions of public education such as school manage
ment, professional development, leadership development, and curriculum.180 Educational Policy
Second, district central offices adapt district structure to support private
sector engagement, including the ability to issue and monitor contracts. Third,
using contracts and looking outside the district when new challenges or needs
arise become part of the “way we do things around here.” In Philadelphia,
movements in this direction include the shifts in district operations described
above. Fourth, contracting becomes a tool for addressing both long-term and
short-term district needs.
Although Philadelphia’s contracting regime and the reforms that it has
implemented have shifted in the direction of the hybrid model, this is not
the only potential form for a contracting regime. For example, one could
envision a contracting regime more consistent with Hill et al.’s (1997, 2000)
ideas, in which contractors work largely independently from the district and
are expected to meet specified outcomes, although such a regime would
require a massive restructuring of the labor market in many states.
55
Discussion and Analysis: Challenges for
Philadelphia’s Contracting Regime
The use of private actors to serve public functions is increasing in edu
cation (see Burch, 2005). To manage these changes, more districts are
likely to make adaptations that move them in the direction of a contracting
regime. But in the context of Philadelphia, what does this mean for long
term reform and issues such as equity and public engagement?
Literature on urban education regimes (i.e., Mossberger & Stoker, 2001;
Stone, 1989) suggests that regimes that incorporate a broad base of stake
holders, including those outside of education such as civic and business
leaders, are more likely to be sustained over time. In Philadelphia, the
highly centralized regime does not include either the business or civic com
munities at the center of decision making. Although it is possible that this
will change over time (e.g., when a new mayor is elected), the current
regime has little space for more central actors.
This lack of broader engagement has caused some to raise questions
about both the role of civic actors and the sustainability of the reform itself.
As Gold and her colleagues (2005) argue, “Contracting relationships may
be making it difficult for [neighborhood-based organizations and advocacy
groups with limited resources]—so often important voices for equity and
sustainability in the city—to take an independent stance from the school
district” (p. 3). Useem (2005) suggests that there are “rumblings” about the
practices around district contracting in the diverse provider model, sayingBulkley / Philadelphia Public Education 181
that “civic and grassroots groups, along with some district insiders, are rais
ing questions about whether contractors’ performance is adequately scruti
nized and shared with the public” (p. 18)
Closely intertwined with issues of voice and influence on the agenda is
the question of to whom organizations are accountable. With the dramatic
increase in contracting, it is possible that many local organizations that pre
viously saw their primary focus as serving parents, students, and the com
munity have shifted (at least a little) their alliances; Gold and her colleagues
(2005) argue that, in a contracting environment, “the responsibility to adhere
to the terms of the contract replaces accountability to parents and commu
nity” (p. 12).
There are also fiscal issues around contracting. In theory, contracting
allows for more efficient use of public money. In Philadelphia, however,
certain aspects of contracting (especially the diverse provider model) are
being supported by increased funds from the state. If those funds are no
longer available, will the district then choose to go away from contracting
that may actually be more costly than the direct provision of services by the
district?
66
Recently, there has been tension between Vallas and the SRC
around budget issues, including the continued use of contracts, in light of
potential state budget cuts (Snyder, 2006a, 2006b) and a $73 million bud
get shortfall report in October 2006.
This leads to the question of how, over time, the contractors involved in
contracting regimes themselves will change. Jeff Henig (personal communi
cation, July 9, 2006) and Patricia Burch (2005) both suggest, in different ways,
that there may be a shift toward contractors that are larger, more national, and
corporate in nature. However, in Philadelphia, contracting with local busi
nesses and nonprofits is being used both to provide services and to promote
political support for the overall regime. This second function may be critical
and would not be served by more national contractors. Will the old adage, “all
politics is local,” be true when it comes to contracting?
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There are also concerns not only about the lack of a broad-based coali
tion behind the reform but also about the extent to which the reform is dri
ven by Vallas’s sense of urgency. As is often the case in a reform associated
with a single charismatic leader, there are concerns for the sustainability of
the reform—and the regime behind it—once Vallas leaves. Finally, there
are questions of effectiveness that will have an impact on the long-term
prospects for contracting regimes, effectiveness in terms of both student
learning (e.g., test scores) and political viability, which will depend on
issues of legitimacy and responsiveness for both districts and the organiza
tions with which they contract.